On Apr 26, 2018, at 1:35 PM, Simon Urbanek <simon.urbanek at r-project.org> wrote:
Marc,
no, the hashes merely a legacy to check that you don't have a corrupted download. They are neither intended nor used for validation. To verify the validity you should use the signature check.
Cheers,
Simon
On Apr 25, 2018, at 4:37 PM, Marc Schwartz <marc_schwartz at me.com> wrote:
Hi Simon,
Thanks for the explanation.
It did not occur to me that SHA-0 was being used, since it was withdrawn as a standard circa early 90's, after significant flaws were identified.
Apple (and others) either have or are moving away from SHA-1 to SHA-2, at least for TLS/PKI security:
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207459
recognizing the differences between session specific TLS/PKI trust uses and longer term file integrity checking. I know Linus is more "relaxed" regarding SHA-1 and the implications for Git, or at least was last year, albeit indicating a path away from it in time.
I guess the question boils down to, if we are going to provide hashes of the files under the premise that it should offer a high level of comfort to useRs that the file has not been modified/replaced since generation, presuming that the published hash value itself was not altered, I would put forth for further discussion, moving to SHA-2 and away from both MD5 and SHA-1 (certainly moving away from SHA-0), depending upon a more broad assessment of the implications of doing so.
Thanks!
Marc
On Apr 25, 2018, at 2:54 PM, Simon Urbanek <simon.urbanek at R-project.org> wrote:
Marc,
thanks, the issue is:
hagal:R-3.5.0$ openssl sha R-3.5.0-el-capitan-signed.pkg
SHA(R-3.5.0-el-capitan-signed.pkg)= 9f5f3365afee54d3fe3148a60c1405955916f076
hagal:R-3.5.0$ openssl sha1 R-3.5.0-el-capitan-signed.pkg
SHA1(R-3.5.0-el-capitan-signed.pkg)= 6e90d38892bb366630ae30c223a898e8af84dff7
so either we change the label to SHA (or SHA-0?) or change the checksum. In the root we actually provide both, even if that may or may not be relevant. For now I did the latter in the index.html.
Cheers,
Simon
On Apr 25, 2018, at 7:57 AM, Marc Schwartz <marc_schwartz at me.com> wrote:
Hi All,
Last month:
https://stat.ethz.ch/pipermail/r-sig-mac/2018-March/012691.html
there was a report that the SHA-1 hash of the R-3.4.4.pkg, as listed on CRAN, was not correct, even though the MD5 hash and the digital signature appeared to be correct.
The same phenomenon is the case with R-3.5.0.pkg.
The MD5 hash on CRAN is:
MD5-hash: 414029c9c9f706d3d04baa887ccffbc4
and I get:
md5 R-3.5.0.pkg
MD5 (R-3.5.0.pkg) = 414029c9c9f706d3d04baa887ccffbc4
from the CLI on my Mac.
However, the SHA-1 hash on CRAN is:
SHA-hash: 9f5f3365afee54d3fe3148a60c1405955916f076
and I get:
shasum R-3.5.0.pkg
6e90d38892bb366630ae30c223a898e8af84dff7 R-3.5.0.pkg
from the CLI on my Mac.
It would seem that there is a lingering issue with the generation of the SHA-1 hash value on CRAN.
Thanks,
Marc Schwartz